We i n vestigate the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for variable selection in models for censored survival data. Kass and Wasserman (1995) showed that BIC provides a close approximation to the Bayes factor when a unit-information prior on the parameter space is used. We propose a revision of the penalty term in BIC so that it is de ned in terms of the number of uncensored events instead of the number of observations. For the simplest censored data model, that of exponential distributions of survival times (i.e. a constant hazard rate), this revision results in a better approximation to the exact Bayes factor based on a conjugate unit-information prior. In the Cox proportional hazards regression model, we propose de ning BIC in terms of the maximized partial likelihood. Using the number of deaths rather than the number of individuals in the BIC penalty term corresponds to a more realistic prior on the parameter space, and is shown to improve predictive performance for assessing stroke risk in the Cardiovascular Health Study.
Introduction
The Bayesian framework for hypothesis testing uses Bayes factors to quantify the evidence for one hypothesized model against another (Kass and Raftery 1995) . Schwarz (1978) derived the Bayesian Information Criterion (or BIC) as a large sample approximation to twice the logarithm of the Bayes factor. For a model M j parameterized by a n m j -dimensional vector j , BIC = ;2f`j(^ j ) ;`0(^ 0 )g + ( m j ; m 0 ) log(n)
(1) where`j(^ j ) a n d 0 (^ 0 ) are the maximized l i k elihoods under M j and a reference model M 0 , whose parameter has dimension m 0 , where n is the sample size. If M 0 is nested within M j , 2 `j(^ j ) ;`0(^ 0 )] is the standard likelihood ratio test (LRT) statistic for testing M 0 against M j , and (m j ; m 0 ) is the number of degrees of freedom associated with that test.
Thus, if the models are nested, BIC is equal to the standard LRT m i n us a complexity penalty w h i c h depends on the degrees of freedom of the test. If BIC< 0, M j is favored over M 0 , and the more negative BIC is, the more M j is favored. BIC provides an approximation to the Bayes factor which can readily be computed from the output of standard statistical software packages. It has been widely used as a statistical model selection criterion see, e.g., Kass and Raftery (1995) , Raftery (1995) , and references therein.
The derivation of BIC involves a Laplace approximation to the Bayes factor, and ignores terms of constant order, including those from the prior, which are dominated by terms from the likelihood when the sample is large enough. Asymptotically, B I C f a vors the \correct" model with a probability that tends to 1 as sample size increases, but the di erence between BIC and twice the log Bayes factor does not vanish asymptotically in general, although it becomes inconsequential in large samples. However, Kass and Wasserman (1995) show that under certain non-restrictive regularity conditions, the di erence between BIC and twice the log Bayes factor does tend to zero for a speci c choice of prior on the parameters. They argue that this implicit prior is a reasonable one. Kass and Wasserman (1995) note that the \sample size" n which appears in the penalty term of (1) must be carefully chosen. Raftery (1995) discusses the use of BIC in several standard statistical models and notes that the choice of n is often not obvious. For censored survival models such as the proportional hazards model of Cox (1972) , subjects contribute widely varying amounts of information to the likelihood. Although all n subjects are incorporated in the likelihood, most of the information comes from the uncensored observations, the ones that have experienced an event. We h a ve found that substituting d, the number of uncensored events, for n, the total number of individuals, in BIC results in an improved criterion without sacri cing the asymptotic properties shown by Kass and Wasserman (1995) .
The Bayesian Information Criterion
Standard Bayesian testing procedures use the Bayes factor (BF), which is the ratio of integrated likelihoods for two competing models. Kass and Raftery (1995) derive BIC as an approximation to twice the di erence in log integrated likelihoods, so that the di erence in BIC between two models approximates twice the logarithm of the Bayes factor. Hence, 2 log(BF) ; BIC 2 log(BF) ! 0:
However, 2 log(BF) ; BIC6 ! 0:
Equation (3) implies that, for general priors on the parameters, 2 log(BF) ; BIC has a nonvanishing asymptotic error of constant order, i.e. of order O(1). Since the absolute value of BIC increases with n, the error tends to zero as a proportion of BIC. Therefore BIC has the undesirable property that for any constant k, B I C + k also approximates twice the log Bayes factor to the same order of approximation as BIC itself. This O(1) error suggests that the BIC approximation is somewhat crude, and may perform poorly for small samples. Kass and Wasserman (1995) show that with nested models, under a particular prior on the parameters, the constant order asymptotic error disappears, and they argue that this prior can reasonably be used for inference purposes. Following the notation of their paper, let Y = ( y 1 : : : y n ) be iid observations from a family parameterized by ( ), with dim( ) = m and dim( )=m 0 . Our goal is to test H 0 : = 0 against H 1 : 2 < m;m 0 .
The Bayes factor for this test is
where and 0 are the priors under H 1 and H 0 , respectively. T h e B a yesian information criterion (BIC) for testing H 0 vs. H 1 is:
Let I be the m m Fisher information matrix of ( ) associated with the full model, and let ( ) be the marginal prior density o f under H 1 . The main result of Kass and Wasserman (1995) This result has an important implication. BIC is a Bayesian procedure which does not require the speci cation of a prior, but it approximates a Bayes factor which is based on a particular prior for the parameter of interest. Therefore, when using BIC to compare models, the Kass-Wasserman result de nes an implicit prior which BIC uses. This prior, which w e call the overall unit information prior, is appealing: it is a normal distribution centered around 0 with the amount of information in the prior equal to the average amount of information in one observation. The prior is vague enough since it is based on only one observation, yet it is proper and not too spread out, and so avoids well documented problems with improper priors (Lindley 1957 Spiegelhalter and Smith 1982) . For a review of this and other reference priors, see Kass and Wasserman (1996). 3 Model Selection in Censored Survival Models
Model Selection
Model selection criteria such as BIC are often used to select variables in regression problems. Here, we use BIC to determine the best models (where models are variable subsets) in a class of censored survival models.
When censoring is present it is unclear whether the penalty in BIC should be n, t h e number of observations, or d, the number of events. When using the partial likelihood (Cox 1972) there are only as many terms in the partial likelihood as there are events d. Kass and Wasserman (1995) indicate that the term used in the penalty should be the rate at which the Hessian matrix of the log-likelihood function grows, which suggests that d is the correct quantity t o u s e . H o wever, if we are to use a revised version of BIC, it is important that the new criterion continue to have the asymptotic properties that Kass and Wasserman derived. In fact, our revised BIC does have these properties, with a slightly revised outcome. Let us alter condition (C3) to be:
where I u ( ) is the expected Fisher information for one uncensored observation, (the uncensored unit information). If this holds, then (5) is true, and the new BIC (with d in the penalty) is an O p (n ; 1 2 ) approximation to twice the Bayes factor where the prior variance on is now equal to the inverse of the uncensored unit information. By using d in the penalty instead of n, w e will show that this asymptotic result holds, the only di erence being in the implicit prior on the parameter.
To i n vestigate which of these criteria is better, we rst consider a simple exponential censored survival model. We use a conjugate unit information prior for this model, and nd that BIC provides a closer approximation to twice the log Bayes factor when n is replaced by d in equation (1). Then we consider the Cox proportional hazards model. The theorems stated in this section are proved in the Appendix.
Exponential Survival
Consider n subjects, where subject i has observed time y i , and let Y = ( y 1 : : : y n ). The censoring indicator i describes whether y i is a survival time ( i = 1) or a censoring time ( i = 0). We consider two competing models:
where T i is the actual time of death for the ith subject (which w i l l b e u n o b s e r v ed if the observed time is a censoring time). BIC corresponds to an implicit normal prior, but the conjugate gamma prior in (8) seems more appropriate here because it puts mass only on positive v alues of , while the normal prior puts some mass on negative v alues of , w h i c h should be excluded. We are interested in how w ell BIC approximates twice the log Bayes factor, which i s 2 log BF = 2 log P(Y jH 0 ) P(Y jH 1 )
where
(10) Since the prior on is not normal, the BIC approximation to twice the log the Bayes factor will have asymptotic error of constant order. We consider two unit-information Gamma priors, one corresponding to using n in the penalty, the other to using d. These priors have mean equal to the null hypothetical value ( 0 ), and variance equal to the inverse expected information in one observation (for n) o r i n o n e uncensored observation (for d). In the n case, this yields a Gamma(q q= 0 ) distribution, where q is the proportion of the data that is censored. In the d case, this yields a Gamma(1 1= 0 ) distribution. We call these the overall unit information prior and the uncensored unit information prior respectively. Using these priors, we can calculate the asymptotic di erence between 2 log BF and BIC for both n and d. W e denote this asymptotic error by AE n or AE d , depending on which penalty t e r m i s used in BIC. The following theorem shows that, asymptotically, using d in the penalty term gives a closer approximation to twice the log Bayes factor.
Theorem 1 Consider comparing the exponential survival models (7) and (8) using BIC under independent censoring. Then jAE d j < jAE n j.
The Cox Proportional Hazards Model
In the Cox (1972) proportional hazards model, the hazard rate for the ith individual at time t is h i (t) = 0 (t) exp(x T i ), where 0 (t) is an unknown baseline hazard rate, common to all individuals, and x i is the vector of covariates for the ith individual. Estimation of is commonly based on the partial likelihood, namely
where R i is the set of individuals at risk at time t i (often called the risk set) (Cox 1972 Cox 1975 . Equation (11) assumes that there are no ties between the times at which deaths occur when there are ties modi cations are necessary, but for simplicity w e do not consider this here.
The parameter for the model is = ( , ), where = f 0 (t) : t 2 R + g. Here, following Raftery, Madigan and Volinsky (1995) , we use the partial likelihood (11) as the likelihood for with integrated out, and use as our integrated likelihood the following:
There are two justi cations for the approximation (12). The rst is that if the prior for is a di use gamma process, then, to a rst order approximation, the partial likelihood is indeed the integral of the likelihood over (Kalb eisch 1978) . The second justi cation is that the partial likelihood (11) actually becomes a full likelihood if a part of the data is discarded, namely the times at which deaths occur. It is a full likelihood for the part of the data consisting of the order in which individuals die and the risk sets, R i , corresponding to each death (Savage 1957 Kalb eisch and Prentice 1973) .
When estimation for the Cox model is based on the partial likelihood, as is usually the case, standard likelihood theory is not directly applicable. However, Andersen and Gill (1982) proved asymptotic results for the partial likelihood which are analogous to those for the standard likelihood, such as asymptotic normality of the MLE. They used the fact that the score vector is a sum of uncorrelated, albeit dependent, terms, which enabled them to implement martingale limit theory. W e use this theory to show that the Kass-Wasserman result (5) holds for Cox proportional hazards models, using either d or n in the penalty.
Suppose that we h a ve s u r v i v al data on n individuals with independent s u r v i v al times y 1 : : : y n , and independent censoring indicators 1 : : : n . Consider the models H 1 : h i (t) = 0 (t) exp(x T i ), and H 0 : h i (t) = Theorem 2 Under null orthogonality and independent censoring, equation (5) holds for Cox models when using n in the penalty for BIC, and the Bayes factor uses a Normal overall unit information prior.
Theorem 3 Under null orthogonality and independent censoring, equation (5) holds for Cox models when using d in the penalty for BIC, and the Bayes factor uses a Normal uncensored unit information prior.
It follows that (5) holds for the Cox model, and that the O(n ; 1 2 ) result also holds for both the overall and the censored unit information priors with the appropriate penalty. I n the following sections we present heuristic and empirical arguments for using d rather than n in the penalty term.
Quantitative Assessment of the Unit Information Priors
The choice of d or n in BIC determines the implicit prior variance. A good reference prior would be fairly at over the region of parameter space in which parameter estimates tend to fall, and would have most of its mass concentrated in that region. By looking at several datasets, we try to assess how w ell the priors t the distribution of parameter estimates seen in practice. In order to compare the two unit information priors, we look at three previously analyzed survival datasets. (Fried et al. 1991 Manolio et al. 1996 : a longitudinal observational study on risk factors for cardiovascular health in the elderly U.S. population.
For each of the studies, we found both the overall and the uncensored unit information priors. These three datasets include a total of 43 candidate independent v ariables for predicting the risk of onset of a disease. Table 1 compares the unit-information priors for the three datasets. For clarity, the results have been standardized by the uncensored unit information standard deviation. In the Cardiovascular Health Study, t h e o verall unit-information prior standard deviations are on average ve times greater than the average of the uncensored unit-information prior standard deviations, re ecting the very high proportion of censoring in these data. The parameter estimates (measured in units of one uncensored unit information standard deviation) range from {0.09 to +0:34, indicating that a prior standard deviation of 5.0 is much more spread out than necessary. F or the three datasets, the range of all the estimates is (;0:65 +0:43), indicating that the uncensored unit information prior (with a prior standard deviation of 1 on this scale) is more realistic because it covers the distribution of estimates very well without being much more spread out. Figure 1 is a histogram of the estimated coe cients in the three datasets, with overall and uncensored unit-information priors also shown. The plot shows that the uncensored unit-information prior puts more prior mass on what is more likely to occur, yet is still a rather conservative prior which a l l o ws for outlying estimates. It thus seems more satisfactory in practice for these data sets.
Example

The Cardiovascular Health Study
In this section we analyze the Cardiovascular Health Study (CHS) in more detail to show the e ect that changing the penalty term can have on the analysis as well as on predictive performance. The CHS is a longitudinal, observational study, funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and started in June 1989 to study cardiovascular disease in people aged 65 and over. The CHS studies 23 possible risk factors for stroke on 4504 subjects, 172 of whom did su er a stroke during the study. With such a di erence between n and d for these data, the choice of the penalty term might h a ve an substantial impact on the model chosen. In what follows we refer to the analyses that use n and d in the penalty term as the n-analysis and the d-analysis, respectively.
For the d-analysis, the best model (according to BIC) has 9 variables (age, diuretic use, regular aspirin use, systolic blood pressure, creatinine level, diabetes, presence of atrial brillation, stenosis of the carotid artery, and a timed walk). When n is used, the penalty Table  1 . A typical unit-information prior distribution corresponding to each of the penalty terms is shown.
for additional parameters is greater, and the best model now c o n tains only 7 variables (the same model as above without age and diuretic use). These models can be compared via their predictive performance. The data were split in half to create a model building set and a validation set. The models are assessed using an analogue of Good's log score (Good 1952) called the partial predictive score (PPS) (Volinsky et al. 1997) . For 50 di erent splits of the data, we calculated the di erence in the PPS. Figure 2 (a) shows the histogram of these 50 di erences. In 35 of the 50 splits, the d-best model performed better than the n-best model. The di erence in PPS was as large as 19.0, indicating that the predictive density p e r e v ent w as higher for the d-best model than for the n-best model by a factor of exp(19:0=86) = 1:25, a 25% improvement in predictive performance per event. On average there was a 3.4% improvement in predictive performance per event.
Bayesian Model Averaging
In variable selection problems, there is often model uncertainty due to the fact that the \true" model is not known. Data analysts often use a model selection procedure such as stepwise regression, and parameter estimates and standard errors are reported conditionally on the model selected. In fact, we do not know that the selected model is the correct one, and so it is desirable to take account of the uncertainty due to the model selection procedure. One way o f doing this is Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA). In a BMA analysis, the posterior distribution of any quantity o f i n terest is a weighted average over the models considered. In several reported experiments with real data, BMA has yielded improved predictive performance and parameter estimation (Madigan and Raftery 1994 Madigan et al. 1995 Volinsky et al. 1997 Raftery et al. 1997 ). An S-PLUS function to do Bayesian model averaging for Cox regression models, bic.surv, i s a vailable from Statlib (lib.stat.cmu.edu/S/bic.surv), and can also be obtained by sending the email message \send bic.surv from S" to statlib@stat.cmu.edu.
To do a BMA analysis, each model's posterior model probability (PMP) is calculated. In our work, these PMPs were approximated using BIC. This technique has been successful in the fast extraction of PMPs from a very large model space (Raftery 1995 Volinsky et al. 1997 Raftery et al. 1997 .
We did BMA analyses of the CHS data using the two competing penalty terms for BIC. So as to avoid having to t all 2 23 models associated with the candidate independent 2 3 variables in the CHS, we l o o k ed at only the best model and at all models with PMPs of at least 1/20th of the best model's PMP (this technique is known as Occam's Window (Madigan and Raftery 1994)). We used a branch and bound algorithm to nd the models in Occam's Window ( V olinsky et al. 1997) . The d-analysis located 408 models ranging in size from 6 to 12 variables (median model size = 10), whereas the n-analysis found 168 models ranging in size from 5 to 9 variables (median model size = 7).
The results for ve of the variables are displayed in Table 2 and show h o w the two di erent penalties can lead to di erent conclusions. For instance, the coe cient o f t h e v ariable aspirin has 100% posterior probability of being non-zero in the d-analysis, indicating very strong evidence that aspirin is a risk factor. In the n-analysis, by contrast, the aspirin parameter has only an 88% posterior probability of not being zero, which, by c o n ventional rules of thumb, is positive but not strong evidence for an e ect. For the next four variables, the data are inconclusive, but di erent conclusions would be drawn in some cases. For instance, the posterior probability that the atrial brillation by ecg parameter is non-zero is 67% with the d prior and 30% with the n prior this is the di erence between weak evidence for an e ect and evidence against an e ect. The table also shows how parameter estimates are a ected by the change in penalty.
Bayesian model averaging has been shown to provide better predictive performance than selecting a single model (Volinsky et al. 1997) . Using d in the penalty for BIC can provide a sharper improvement than using n, a s s h o wn in Figure 2 (b). For each of 50 splits of the data, we ran a BMA analysis using BIC to calculate posterior model probabilities, and using the partial predictive score to assess predictive performance. In 42 of the 50 simulations, the d-analysis predicted better than the n-analysis. Overall, predictive performance per event improved by 3.1%.
Discussion
The unit-information prior is a reasonable one when there is little prior information. In fact, one could argue that there is always a small amount of prior information, namely that which led us to collect the data on the chosen independent v ariables in the rst place. The unit-information prior quanti es this small bit of information as the average amount o f information in one observation.
In this paper, we h a ve c o n trasted two competing unit information priors. The prior based on d is the unit-information prior for one uncensored observation (I u ), and as such does not depend on the proportion of censoring. In contrast the overall unit-information prior (I) i s typically qI u (as in the exponential survival example), and will be a ected by the proportion of censoring, which m a y not be desirable. Consider two i d e n tical clinical trials where the rst trial is stopped after one year and the second trial is stopped after two y ears. The second trial is likely to have a smaller percentage of censoring. The d-based prior for the two trials would be the same, apart from sampling variability. T h e n-based prior, in contrast, would be di erent the n based prior for the one-year trial would be substantially more dispersed than that for the d-based trial. This strong dependence of the n-based prior on the stopping rule seems undesirable. This paper provides several arguments for using d in the penalty term for BIC for the purposes of model selection in censored survival models. For the simple case of exponential survival, using d with the uncensored unit-information prior variance provides a better approximation to twice the log Bayes factor for a unit-information conjugate prior. For Cox proportional hazards models, the d-based prior yields better predictive performance than the n-based prior in the examples we considered. The quantitative e v aluation of the prior suggests that d corresponds to a more realistic implicit prior for the Bayes factor. We believe that our results argue in favor of using d rather than n in BIC for censored survival models.
Appendix: Proofs
Theorem 1 Let T = P y i be the total survival time, d = P i be the number of events, and q be the probability of censoring (constant o ver subjects by the assumption of independent censoring). ;(a) , and ? represents either d or n. F ollowing Kass and Wasserman (1995) , the overall unit information prior for when using n in the BIC penalty term has mean 0 and overall unit information variance 2 0 =q. This corresponds to the prior distribution Gamma(q q= 0 ). Substituting a = q b= q= 0 into (13) gives the asymptotic error associated with using n: AE n = 2(log BF n ;BIC n ) = 2 fq log(q)+log( ;(q + d) ;(q) );(q+d) log(q+d)+d+ 1 2 log(n)g: (15) Similarly, u s i n g d in the penalty term gives the uncensored unit information prior Gamma(1 1= 0 ). The asymptotic error associated with d is Finally, w e p r o ve the theorem by showing that asymptotically, jAE d j is smaller than jAE n j. As n ! 1 , jAE d j ; j AE n j ! 2f1 + ( q ; 1 2 ) l o g ( q) ; log(;(q)) ; qg (17) which i s n e g a t i v e for all 0 < q < 1 , a n d 0 f o r q = 1 : 2
It su ces to show the three conditions preceding (5) hold. (C1) holds by assumption. Conditions (C2) and (C3) hold by Theorem 3.2 in Andersen and Gill (1982) .
Theorem 3 Again, condition (C1) holds by assumption, and (C2) holds by Andersen and Gill (1982) . To p r o ve ( 5 ) , w e need to show that (6) holds. To do this, we present a slight alteration of the proof in Andersen and Gill (1982) . First, some notation is needed. Let N i (t) = I (T i t i =1) be the counting process for individual i N(t) = P i N i (t) be the total counting process for the data Y i (t) = I (T i t) be the risk set at time t S 
The rst two terms on the right side of (18) converge to zero in probability b y Lenglart's inequality (Fleming and Harrington, Theorem 3.4.1) . The third term converges to zero by an application of a corollary to Lenglart's inequality (Fleming and Harrington, Corollary 3.4 .1 and Lemma 8.2.1). The fourth term converges to zero by the de nition of s (0) ( 0 x ) and the fact that R 0 0 (x)dx < 1: 2
